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This paper discusses the application of the equilibrium displacement model 
(EDM) to estimate ex-ante the welfare effects of biological productivity growth 
for semi-subsistence crop and its impact on poverty reduction. The conventionally 
used EDM is compared with an alternative model (alternative EDM) that reflects 
arguably more realistic assumptions for African semi-subsistence crops, such as 
the shape and shift of supply curve, significant margins due to high transportation 
costs between farmgate and consumption market, as well as between different 
consumption markets, and the degree of precisions of estimated structural 
parameters. The application to the dataset for Benin cassava farmers provides an 
example that the conventional EDM may significantly overestimate the total 
welfare gains, and may also lead to very different interpretation of how pro-poor 
the technology is.  
Key words: equilibrium displacement model, pivotal shift, cassava, semi-
subsistence, market margins, double buffering 
JEL classifications: C65, D13, D31, D60, Q11, Q12 
 
1.  Introduction and research questions 
Biotechnology including genetic modification (GM) has a potential to significantly 
increase the yield of many orphan crops such as cassava in Sub-Sahara Africa. Public research 
on semi-subsistence crops like cassava can greatly influence the development of pro-poor 
technologies since semi-subsistence cassava producers are often the most impoverished citizens 
of even the low-income countries.  
The fact that cassava is generally non-traded and a semi-subsistence crop help us roughly 
identify that a productivity growth for non-traded agricultural crops often benefits consumers 
rather than producers, particularly when the demand for those crops is inelastic leading to a 
sharper decline in the crop price. The scale-neutral productivity growth for semi-subsistence 
crops may, however, benefit producers because producers also benefit as consumers (Hayami 
and Herdt, 1977; Norton et al., 1987; Qaim, 2001; Andreu et al. 2006). The equilibrium 
displacement model (EDM) is often used to estimate ex-ante welfare effects for producers as 
well as consumers.  
  The literature often employs the EDM with several restrictive assumptions (called 
conventional EDM hereafter) about semi-subsistence producers. Among the key assumptions for 
conventional EDM, this study focuses on 1) linear supply curve; 2) productivity growth as 
expressed by a parallel shift in supply curve; and 3) zero market margins (producers and 
consumers face a single price)
1. Due to its simplicity, conventional EDM is also subject to other 
restrictive assumptions as discussed in section 2.  
  Literature raises questions to these restrictive assumptions, although they are often 
employed to facilitate the estimation of welfare gains. Market margins can be significantly large 
and have complicated structures in the market for semi-subsistence crops (Barrett, 2008). Several 
lines of theoretical reasoning can also invalidate assumptions of a linear supply curve and a 
                                                           
1 Another implicit assumption in conventional EDM is perfectly inelastic home consumption. The relaxation of the 
perfectly inelastic home consumption assumption, however, has relatively small impacts on the estimated welfare 
effects, and thus excluded from the subsequent discussion, although it is included in the actual estimation of 
alternative EDM. 3 
 
parallel shift in the supply curve used as opposed to other forms such as pivotal shifts, 
particularly for biological productivity growth (Lindner and Jarrett, 1978; Rose, 1980).  
  The consequence of restrictive assumptions in conventional EDM has been less studied 
on either aggregated welfare effects or more disaggregated welfare effects, which reflect 
distributional effects, of certain types of productivity growth. Some of the consequences can be 
seen rather straightforwardly. For example, as is discussed later, assumptions 1) through 3) if 
combined, tend to underestimate (overestimate) the benefit of virus-resistant biological 
productivity growth for producers who belong to the higher (lower) farmgate price zones. In the 
case of cassava producers in Benin, lower-income cassava producers tend to sell cassava at 
higher farmgate price possibly because of their proximity to major consumption market
2. Using 
conventional EDM therefore can potentially underestimate the pro-poorness of virus-resistant 
cassava in Benin.  
  It is, however, rather complicated to assess the degree of aforementioned underestimation 
since it involves simultaneously relaxing aforementioned assumptions and they must be 
estimated using the parameters such as supply and demand elasticities that are also empirically 
estimated and thus contain errors. This study therefore uses a simulation approach to assess the 
quantitative aspects of how conventional EDM may bias the pro-poorness of potential impacts of 
virus-resistant GM cassava in Benin. More specifically, this study therefore examines how the 
conventional EDM underestimates the pro-poorness of GM cassava by reformulating the 
conventional EDM, a model with alternative assumptions (called alternative EDM hereafter), 
namely 1') supply curve in constant elasticity form; 2') productivity growth as expressed by a 
pivotal shift in supply curve; 3') non-zero market margins with structures indicated by Barrett 
(2008). This study then empirically compares conventional and alternative EDM using the Benin 
data set
3. 
  This study contributes to the literature by improving our understanding of how the 
conventional EDM with restrictive assumptions on transactions costs and biological productivity 
growth may provide a significantly different picture of the total size and pro-poorness of the 
welfare effects of biological productivity growth in Sub-Sahara African countries.   
 
2.  Conceptual framework 
2.1  Conventional EDM and its restrictive assumptions  
  The equilibrium displacement model, originally developed by Muth (1964), is one 
method used to evaluate ex-ante the economic effects of scale-neutral productivity growth 
(Alston et al., 1998) and has been applied to semi-subsistence agriculture (Hayami and Herdt, 
1977; Norton et al., 1987; Qaim, 1999, 2001; Andreu et al., 2006). Despite some limitations, 
EDM is still a powerful tool to measure the aggregate welfare effects of certain population 
groups when conducting an ex-ante welfare-effects analysis for GM subsistence cassava.  
  The market clearing conditions for the equilibrium displacement model can be expressed 
as,  
) , ( , , i i s i s p q q     (1) 
                                                           
2 Although they sell cassava at higher farmgate price, they are still with low-income because their production costs 
are high, and production is small.  
3 The alternative EDM itself is proposed by neither Barrett (2008), Alston et al. (1998) nor other studies, but is a 
model this dissertation proposes by replacing four assumptions in conventional EDM with those of alternative EDM, 
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in which qs,i is cassava supply by household i, qd is the cassava demand which is further broken 
down into demand by producer themselves  home
di q  and demand by the rest of the consumer 
market
di q , δi is the production technology level that affects the marginal cost curve. Conventional 
EDM assumes p = farmgate sales price = consumption price.  
 
2.1.1  Conventional EDM     
  With a productivity growth, in conventional EDM, supply curve qs,i shifts in parallel 
vertically down by δi where δi / p = Ki with Ki defined as % reduction in MC relative to the 
equilibrium price p = p0. The welfare effects for producers (∆PW) and consumers (∆CS) are 
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in which  i s,  is price elasticity of production by producer (or producer groups) i, εd is price 
elasticity of demand (including home consumption), Ki is % reduction in production costs, hi is 
proportion of home consumption to production by i, and ssi is the proportion of production by i 
to total production. Total welfare effect (∆Total) is simply 
CS PW     Total   (7) 
2.1.2  Restrictive assumptions behind conventional EDM and alternative assumptions in 
alternative EDM 
  The advantage of conventional EDM is that, given the basic information of productivity 
growth, welfare gains can be easily calculated using formulas (4) through (7). The conventional 
EDM is, however, subject to assumptions that are questionable in the context of semi-subsistence 
crops. Among those, three assumptions (listed in Table 1) are discussed in this section while 
Figure 1 through Figure 4 illustrate how those assumptions may be relaxed in alternative EDM 
using the example of two cassava producing households with different characteristics.  
 
Table 1. Underlying assumptions for conventional EDM and alternative EDM 
  Conventional EDM  Alternative EDM 
Supply curve  Linear  Constant elasticity 
Shift in supply curve  Parallel  Pivotal 
Market margin  Zero  Positive 5 
 
 
2.1.2.1  Linearity of the supply curve and shifts in the supply curve (parallel or pivotal) 
  Formula (4) assumes linear supply curves with productivity growth expressed as a 
parallel shift in the supply curve. Using (4) when the supply elasticity is less than one is 
controversial. Any linear supply curve with elasticity less than one measured at the initial 
equilibrium has zero MC for upto some positive production quantity. Voon and Edwards (1991) 
also prefer the use of constant elasticity form with pivotal shifts since it provides more 
conservative estimates of benefits than does the linear form when the supply elasticity is less 
than one, which is the case of this study. The alternative EDM assumes a supply curve in 
constant elasticity form, which avoids the problem of zero MC for positive production quantity. 
  The alternative EDM uses a pivotal shift to express productivity growth. First, a pivotal 
shift in a constant elasticity supply curve assumes a proportional reduction in MC at each 
production quantity. For biological or yield-increasing productivity growth that does not require 
additional input, such as GM cassava, a proportional reduction in marginal cost may be realistic 
since for each unit of output a farmer reduces the input by the same proportion. Therefore a 
pivotal shift in the supply curve is more reasonable (Lindner and Jarrett, 1978; Rose, 1980).  
  Second, for computation purposes, when we assume different farmgate price levels, 
assuming the same reduction in MC for all producers is questionable.  Moreover, it is not 
feasible in simulation since the reduction in MC can be greater than the initial level of MC for 
some producers with relatively low MC at the initial equilibrium production level.  
 
2.1.2.2  Zero market margins in conventional EDM  
High transactions costs in Africa have been widely reported in literature and significant 
margins exist both between farmgate price and the local consumption market price, and between 
consumption markets (Barrett, 2008). Alternative EDM incorporates positive market margins 
between farmgate sales price and consumption market price in a very specific way. Although 
later sections describe this issue in more depth, I define consumption market here as the end-
market of cassava, as opposed to intermediate markets like collection points
4. One way to 
incorporate market margins to reflect either the difference in farmgate price and end-market 
price or the difference in end-market prices in different regions is to keep those market margins 
constant and exogenous to productivity growth (Alston et al., 1998, p. 317), which will be 
employed in the alternative EDM as is described in later sections.  
 
                                                           
4 The terms “consumption market” and “collection point” are both used in the Benin data set. Although the Benin 
data set does not provide the definitions of these terms, “collection point” is often used to refer to a place where 
cassava sellers bring their cassava to traders who then transport cassava to the consumption market. I distinguish 
consumption market from collection point in that in the consumption market, cassava reaches consumers, and from 
the consumer welfare perspective, the price of cassava in the consumption market is more important than the price in 
collection points. Therefore in the EDM, I focus on the estimated price at the consumption market, not at the 
collection point, to calibrate the demand curve that represents the aggregate marginal utility of cassava consumption 
in Benin. 
     Collection point is still important when I estimate the farmgate sales price of some cassava producers who report 
only the price at the collection points. Prices received at this collection point should include some margin in addition 
to the farmgate price, and this margin is similar to the margin between the farmgate price and the price at the 
consumption market. 6 
 
2.1.3  Other important properties in conventional EDM 
  Estimates from conventional EDM are proportional to the initial equilibrium price p0 in 
(4) through (6). Since plant breeding research is often justified based on the total benefit, the 
level of p0 is critical in the estimation of welfare effects using EDM. Literature using 
conventional EDM generally uses farmgate price reported by secondary sources like the FAO or 
local government as p0 (Qaim 1999, 2001) or the average of reported farmgate and wholesale 
prices (Andreu et al., 2006). The information of p0 is, however, less accurate or simply 
unavailable for some developing countries and commodities
5. The estimation of p0 for cassava is 
particularly difficult since cassava is rarely traded outside the country and no border price exists 
as it does for crops like maize. The definition of p0 is also vague when there are different price 
levels. Later sections describe how this study defines and estimates a price equivalent to p0. 
  Another important property of conventional EDM, particular embedded in (4) through (6), 
is that when Ki is the same for all i, εd < 0 and εsi > 0, then conventional EDM tends to estimate 
more positive ∆PWi for producers with larger production qsi
6. As shown in the simulation, the 
alternative EDM may be less affected by the restrictions mentioned here, although it may be 
rather difficult to generalize the results. 
 
2.2  The representation of cassava market with double-buffer concept in Barrett (2008)    
  Market margin, primarily composed of transportation costs, are relatively high in Sub-
Sahara African countries, and individual as well as aggregate supply and demand can be 
significantly different from those under no market margin. Section 2.2.1 describes the supply and 
demand schedules for semi-subsistence farmers facing high market margins between farmgate 
and consumption market following Minot (1999) and how welfare effects are measured. The 
section 2.2.2 describes how the market for non-traded crops like cassava is cleared when there 
are multiple consumption markets whose difference in equilibrium price is largely determined by 
the inter-market margins.  
 
2.2.1  The effect of market margin between farmgate and consumption market   
2.2.1.1  Household supply and home consumption curve
7    
  There is one cassava producing-household i and a large market where a large quantity of 
cassava is traded at price CM
i p (Figure 5). For household i, the total cost (including opportunity 
cost of input factors) of producing qp unit of cassava $C(qp) includes the opportunity cost of time 
required for planting seeds and weeding and the opportunity cost of land required. Since land is 
scarce and labor is often limited (especially if there is a failure in the labor market) for many 
cassava-producing households, we assume ∂C(qp)/ ∂qp is strictly increasing in qp.  
  Household i derives utility U(qC) from consuming qC unit of cassava. The household 
consumes cassava as food, gifts for the family or in-kind payment for labor, and we assume that 
the marginal utility of cassava consumption is strictly decreasing in qC. 
  With given C(qp) and U(qc), household i can decide either to sell or buy some cassava at 
the market or not to trade cassava at all, depending on CM
i p and the per unit transport cost. If the 
per unit transport cost is τi, then the farmgate sales price 
f
i p for i is
f
i p = 
CM
i p – i ˆ . Similarly, the 
                                                           
5 For example, the FAO does not provide producer prices for cassava for Benin but does for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Togo. 
6 See Appendix A. 1. 




i p for i is 
p
i p  = 
CM
i p + i ˆ . The relationship between
f
i p and 
p
i p  is 
thus
f
i p = 
p
i p  – 2 i ˆ .  
  The household supply and demand curves for cassava are similar to market supply and 
demand curves except, as in Minot (1999), the supply and demand of cassava become perfectly 
inelastic when the market price is in a band with width 2 i ˆ  (Figure 6). 
  Productivity growth for semi-subsistence farmers first shifts the marginal cost curve and 
the production and home consumption curves under new production technologies are derived as 
was in Figure 6. Figure 7 illustrates the productivity growth as the shifts in supply and 
consequent home consumption curves.  
 
2.2.1.2  Welfare measurement for subsistence farmers (Marshallian surplus) 
  We measure the welfare of a cassava-producing household in a form similar to the 
concept of the Marshallian surplus
8. Let us define Q* as Q* = max[Q
P, Q
C]. More specifically, 
Q* = Q
P for a cassava-selling household, Q* = Q
C for a cassava-purchasing household, and Q* = 
Q
P = Q
C for an autarkic household. With Q*, the welfare for a cassava-producing household i 
(Wi) can be expressed as 
  dq p q MC p q MU W
i Q
i i i i i 

   
0
CM CM ] ˆ ), ( min[ ] ˆ ), ( max[     (8)  
in which MU and MC are marginal utility curve and marginal cost curve, respectively.    
  The expression “max[MU(q),  CM
i p – i ˆ ] – min[MC(q),  CM
i p + i ˆ ]” measures the 
maximum possible net benefit a cassava producer can derive from the q-th unit of cassava at 
hand. Since a cassava producer has Q* of cassava to derive net benefit from, his total welfare can 
be measured by integrating “max[MU(q),  CM
i p – i ˆ ] – min[MC(q),  CM
i p + i ˆ ]” up to Q*.  
 
2.2.2  The effect of market margins between consumption markets 
  This section describes how cassava prices vary across different consumption markets 
inside Benin, and how the price difference can be treated exogenous to cassava productivity 
growth. The assumptions presented in this section on are not necessarily the most accepted 
assumptions in the literature and are sometimes made in order to facilitate the simulation while 
maintaining consistency with the Benin data set. This paper, however, still employs additional 
assumptions since the assumption of zero market margins employed in EDM for subsistence 
crops in past literature is very restrictive and that it is important to examine how zero market 
margin assumptions may bias the estimated welfare effects for certain population groups.  
 
                                                           
8 The benefit of using the Marshallian demand curve instead of the Hicksian demand curve is that the Marshallian 
demand curve can be estimated with less information, like income elasticity, than can the Hicksian demand curve 
(Altson et al., 1995). Although the welfare effects using the Marshallian demand curve are biased since it ignores the 
income effect caused by cassava productivity growth, Alston and Larson (1993) argue that the bias included in the 
Marshallian demand curve may be smaller relative to the additional errors brought into the estimation of welfare 
effects in the process of recovering the Hicksian demand curve from the Marshallian demand curves using the 
empirically estimated elasticities. That is the reason this study continues using the the Marshallian demand curve to 
conduct EDM, even though the estimation of demand curves in the previous chapter includes the income effects as 
well. 8 
 
2.2.2.1  Double-buffering  
  Figure 8 illustrates the concept similar to double-buffering in Barrett (2008). There are 
two layers of channels through which cassava is traded, one between each cassava producer and 
local consumption market and the other between different consumption markets. Barrett (2008) 
distinguishes the relationship between semi-subsistence farmers and the local markets from the 
relationship between semi-subsistence local markets and other markets.  
  Applying the argument by Barrett (2008), the price of the commodity in each non-
autarkic market j differs from prices in other markets by the difference in the margin between 
each market j and border price, or the international price. The “geographic specificity” of price 
(Barrett, 2008) has been frequently observed for many commodities in Africa, and also appears 
consistent with the Benin dataset. It therefore seems appropriate to employ (9) in the EDM:  
 
Assumption: Price differences across different consumption markets are exogenously 
fixed to the GM cassava introduction in ex-ante welfare effects estimation using EDM  (9)  
 
  The (9) relates to the theory of market integration widely studied in the literature 
regarding the efficiency of inter-market price transmissions, and generally supported for West 
African countries including Benin (Kuiper et al, 1999; Badiane and Shively, 1998). 
  Several questions, however, remain regarding how restrictive (9) is. First, it is unclear 
whether the argument by Barrett (2008) holds for cassava since it is generally not traded 
internationally and no “border price” exists for cassava. Second, it remains to be seen how (9) 
facilitates the inclusion of market margins to EDM with certain limitations associated with the 
Benin data set, even though (9) requires that no local market j is autarkic.  
 
2.2.2.2  Price determination schemes 
  For commodities traded internationally, their prices in each market (either consumption 
market or collection point) inside the country can be expressed as 
autarkic   is     if
market   exporting an    is     if ) , ( ˆ
market   importing an    is     if ) , ( ˆ
, j p p
j Q G p p


















  (10) 
in which p
cb is the border price or price at the international market,  M
j ˆ is market-specific 
transactions costs, G is “the state of public goods and services (e.g., communication and 
transport infrastructure, property rights, etc.)”, Q is “the aggregate throughput in the local 
market”, and 
a CM
j p , is “the local market price that equates local market demand […] with local 
market supply” (Barrett, 2008)
9.  
  (9) requires that relationships similar to (10) hold for cassava which is not traded 
internationally, has no border price and that no consumption market is autarkic. First we define 
weighted average consumption price of cassava (fresh-tuber equivalent), P ˆ , equivalent to p
cb for 
cassava as 
                                                           
9 Notations are modified from those in Barrett (2008) to fit this paper.  9 
 

















ˆ ˆ   (11) 
in which  j D ˆ is fresh-tuber equivalent quantity of cassava consumed in consumption market j. As 
is clear from (11), P ˆ  is the weighted average consumption price of cassava with share of  j D ˆ to 
the total consumption (j j D ˆ ) used as weights. I then define the relationship 
between CM




j P p ˆ ˆ ˆ     (12) 
in which  CM
j ˆ measures the difference between  CM
j p ˆ and P ˆ .  CM
j ˆ is the counterpart of  M
j ˆ  in 
(10), except  CM
j ˆ can be both positive and negative since it is unclear whether consumption 
market j is an exporting or importing market.  j D ˆ  is defined as  






ji ji j X H S D ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   (13) 
in which ji S ˆ , ji H ˆ are production and home consumption by producer i and  kj X ˆ is the net trade 
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  (14) 
In other words, cassava is traded only from a lower-price consumption market to a higher-price 
consumption market.  
 
2.2.2.3  Assumptions of no autarkic consumption market(s) 
  The second requirement in (9) is that no consumption market or group of consumption 
markets is autarkic. In other words, every consumption market j must trade cassava with at least 
one other consumption market, and every subgroup of consumption markets must trade cassava 
with at least one other subgroup of consumption markets. Figure 9 presents some of the 
examples that satisfy or violate the requirement.  
 
2.2.3  Disaggregation of the EDM to the individual cassava producer’s level 
  The simulation in later section calibrates the model for individual observations in the 
Benin dataset and is thus more disaggregated than some other studies that apply EDM. This 
study argues the benefit of disaggregating EDM on the following counts, although aggregated 
EDM in previous literature has required less information and may be more robust to the violation 
of assumptions employed in disaggregated EDM.  
  Aggregated supply and demand curves may be illustrated as in Figure 6, although Figure 
6 is used for individual cassava producers, with a good approximation of market margin τ for the 
entire market. This paper, however, argues that Figure 6 is not a very good representation of 
aggregated supply and demand. For example Figure 6, if used for aggregate market, implies 10 
 
perfectly inelastic aggregate supply and demand when price is in a certain range, which is not 
only too restrictive but also requires the assumption that all producers face the same per-unit 
transactions costs. In addition, the Benin data suggests significant variations in price received by 
each cassava producer or heterogeneity in the characteristics of producers.  
  Supply and demand curves for a semi-subsistence cassava producer in Figure 6 can thus 
be linked to the average consumption price P, as in Figure 10.   
 
2.3  Summary of alternative EDM 
  In summary, alternative EDM can be defined as the counterpart of (1) through (3). The 
above discussion of different consumption market prices can be extended to the case in which 
each observation in Benin dataset trades cassava at its corresponding consumption market
10. We 
therefore, from this point on, replace notation j used to indicate consumption market in the 
previous sections, with i that indicates each household observation.  
  With the price * ˆ P and 
CM
i ˆ as defined in (22) and (23),P ˆ satisfies the following market 
clearing condition:  






i i i i i i
CM CM CM P D P H P S        (15) 
where ) ( i S and ) ( i H are cassava production and home consumption curves with cassava price at 
the nearest consumption market and per-unit transactions costs to transport cassava from the 
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  (16) 
in which Ai is the adoption rate of a new GM variety among producer group i, ∆Yi is the yield 
growth expressed as the horizontal shift in supply curve. In the context of structure as in (10), 
CM
i p ˆ should in theory be determined through condition (17) although in this study (17) is 
simplified as (17'), 
     
M CM M CM
M CM M CM CM CM CM
M CM M CM
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
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ˆ ˆ   if , ˆ ˆ ˆ
   
     








i P p  ˆ ˆ ˆ     (17') 
  First, condition (17) is similar to the supply and demand curves for individual producers. 
Condition (17'), on the other hand, states that the initial difference between
CM
i p ˆ andP ˆ
 for each i 
                                                           
10 This is reasonable since the data is collected in a way such that each observation represents a group of farmers in 
the same village. 11 
 
(= CM
i  ˆ ) is set constant in the simulation since the consumption volume in each market i is 
unavailable. In other words, we assume that if consumption market i is a net exporter of cassava, 
then it remains a net exporter throughout the entire period, and vice versa. This assumption is 
required so that the simulation reflects the regional differences in cassava price in a way 
consistent with the data set, which is why this study employs (17') instead of (17).  
  In addition, condition (15) needs slight modification in the simulation. We modify (15) to 
        0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ       P D P H P S
I
i
i i i i i i
CM CM       (18) 
in which we use the aggregate demand function D(P) instead of    
i i i
CM P D ˆ ˆ
 
since the 
information is only available for aggregate cassava consumption by non-producers
11.   
  Welfare  for  a  cassava -producing  household  i  (Wi)  that  is  expressed  as  (8)  can  be 
measured for both with and without GM cassava. To express the measurement of welfare gains, 
we  first  define  Wi  for  with  GM  cassava  ( GM
i W )  and  without  GM  cassava  ( GM   No
i W ).  For 
convenience,  we  expand  the  notation  for  
i Q ,  CM
i p ,  ) (q MC  that  change  between  with  GM 
cassava and without GM cassava to  GM , 
i Q ,  GM CM,
i p  and  ) ( GM q MC for with GM cassava, and 
GM   No , 
i Q ,  GM   No CM,
i p  and  ) ( GM   No q MC for with GM cassava.  GM
i W  and  GM   No
i W  are then  
  dq p q MC p q MU W
i Q
i i i i i 

   
GM ,
0
GM CM, GM GM CM, GM ] ˆ ), ( min[ ] ˆ ), ( max[     (8') 
  dq p q MC p q MU W
i Q
i i i i i 

   
GM   No   ,
0
GM   No   CM, GM   No GM   No   CM, GM   No ] ˆ ), ( min[ ] ˆ ), ( max[     (8") 
The welfare effects for producer group i (∆PWi) for alternative EDM is therefore  
GM   No GM
i i i W W PS      (19)  
  Welfare effects for consumers (non-cassava producers) ∆CS in alternative EDM is  








) (   (20)  
in which the notation for price P as defined in (11) is expanded to 
GM   No ˆ P  and 
GM ˆ P .. 
                                                           
11 This requires certain assumptions on the shape of   
CM
i i P D ˆ ˆ  ,
 which is the demand curve for each consumption 
market. For example, if we assume the aggregate demand curve D(P) to have constant elasticity of demand such that 
D(P) = AP
η with η as demand elasticity, Di may not be exactly in constant elasticity form. More precisely, we may 
have,  
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Therefore the assumption of D(P) = AP
η requires that not all Dis have constant elasticity form. The literature, 
however, uses constant elasticity forms as well as linear forms for aggregate demand curve often with little 
theoretical reasoning. This study therefore regards (18) to be appropriate.  12 
 
  As summarized in Table 3, the alternative EDM consists of individual supply and home 
consumption  schedules  (equations  (16),  (17'))  and  market  clearing  conditions  (18).  Welfare 
measurements ∆PW and ∆CS in the alternative EDM are generally expressed as (19) and (20). 
 
3.  Empirical comparison of conventional EDM and alternative EDM 
  We now conduct a welfare effects estimation using both conventional EDM and 
alternative EDM for hypothetical introduction of GM cassava in Benin and examine how the two 
EDMs provide different estimates of welfare effects, whether the two EDMs indicate differently 
how the welfare gains are distributed across cassava producers with different income levels.  
 
3.1  Estimation methods 
  This section describes how this study uses the dataset from Benin to calibrate the 
parameters introduced in the conceptual framework above. The description here is for the 
alternative EDM in Table 2 and this section also briefly summarizes an additional model that is 
included due to reasons explained in 3.1.2.  
 
3.1.1  Structure and calibration of the model 
  The structural parameters used in alternative EDM are listed in Table 4, some of which 
are estimated from the data set, and the others are calculated as described below using specific 
assumptions in manners consistent with the discussions in section 2.  
 
3.1.1.1  Condition (11) in the Benin data set  
  In calculatingP ˆ in (11) using the Benin data set, this study assumes that i D ˆ can be 
approximated as  
  i i i i w H S D ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ      (21) 
in which i S ˆ and i H ˆ are production and home consumption quantities reported by producer i 
and i w ˆ is the sample weight for observation i in the Benin data set. In other words,   i i i w H S ˆ ˆ ˆ  
 
is the total net sales of cassava supplied to local consumption market i sold by producers 
represented by observation i.  
  Equation (21) assumes that almost all cassava consumed in consumption market i is 
provided by the local cassava farmers who sell cassava to market i and that a relatively small 
quantity of cassava is transported between different consumption markets. As was mentioned 
above, each observation i represents the group of i w ˆ similar producers who all sell cassava to the 
same consumption market i. P ˆ is therefore approximated to

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in which 
CM
i p ˆ is estimated from the data set (discussed in equation (29)). With (12) and (22),  

  P pCM
i
CM
i ˆ ˆ ˆ    (23) 
  The assumption behind (22) is that interregional trade is small relative to the 
consumption quantity in each local consumption market, while (23) still reflects (9). Although 13 
 
there is no direct evidence, some studies indicate that the quantity of cassava traded inter-
regionally is small relative to total production (Gabre-Madhin et al., 2001).  
  Section 2.1.3 discussed how the choice of p is important in conventional EDM and that 
Qaim (1999, 2001) uses farmgate price. In this simulation, since the representative farmgate 
price is unavailable, p is defined as the weighted average of farmgate price 
f
P ˆ  estimated for 



















ˆ ˆ   (24) 
  The Benin data set contains the 
f
i p of cassava for only on-farm sellers, and i   for only 
off-farm sellers. This study follows Vakis et al. (2003) to predict
f
i p ˆ and i ˆ  for all cassava 
producers, including autarkic producers, in the data set. More specifically, we first run 
regressions  
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  sellers   farm   off   , ln     i u x i i i
      (26) 
in which
pf
i x and 
i x are exogenous factors assumed to affect
f
i p and i   respectively. We then 
obtain the predicted values of 
f
i p ,  i   and CM
i p as, 
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i p p  ˆ ˆ ˆ     (29) 
in which (29) indicates the assumption that for every producer group i, there is a consumption 
market i which is an end-market for cassava, and the price at consumption market i ( CM
i p ˆ ) also 
satisfies condition (12). Although very strict, the assumption (30) allows market clearing 
condition (15)) (shown below) to be valid without the actual data for price in each consumption 
market and enables the simulation using Benin data. 
  Using (29) and formula (22), we calculateP ˆ , which is the price that satisfies the market 
clearing conditions in the alternative EDM in (18). Although    i i H S ˆ ˆ Salesi = 0 for i = autarkic 
producers,  CM
i p ˆ   is still defined for such markets in (29)
12.  CM
i  ˆ is then obtained as the 
difference between CM
i p ˆ and P ˆ
 for each i and kept constant before and after productivity growth.   
  Conventional EDM generally uses the reported farmgate price as p in the model. In this 
study, by using formula (24) and 
f
i p ˆ estimated above, weighted average farmgate price
f
P ˆ is 
calculated and inserted into p in formulas (4) through (7).  
                                                           
12 Extending the assumption in section 2.2.2.2, for i = autarkic producers, Di ≠ 0 so that  CM
i p ˆ is set by the 
transportation costs between other consumption markets, but Di is small enough so that price  CM
i p ˆ does not affect 
the average consumption price P.  14 
 
  Supply and consumption curves (Si and Hi in (16)) can be calibrated using
f
i p ˆ , estimated 
production and consumption elasticities ( si  ˆ , hi  ˆ ), reported production ( i S ˆ ) and home 
consumption quantity ( i H ˆ ). Calibration for autarkic producers is more complicated. As 
illustrated in Figure 15, given
f
i p ˆ , i ˆ ,  i S ˆ  (= i H ˆ ) and si  ˆ , Si and Hi can be any of (a) ~ (c). 
Whether each autarkic producer has supply and home consumption curves like (a), (b) or (c) 
affects how productivity growth through GM cassava leads to a change in aggregate supply 
throughout the entire market and P, and thus the welfare effects estimation.  


































  for i = autarkic  (31) 
in which δ ~ U [0, 2] which is one of the stochastic parameters included in the simulation as 
listed in Table 8. To be more precise, δ = 1 in Figure 15(b) and δ = 0.5 in Figure 15(a), δ = 1.5 
in (c). With δ ~ U [0, 2], we assume MC and MU for autarkic producers so that C is uniformly 
distributed in A and B.  Alternative methods are available but have little practicality
13. 
 
3.1.2  Other models  
  In addition to conventional and alternative EDM, one additional model is estimated. 
Three models are therefore compared as characterized in Table 2. The differences between each 
model are the shape of the supply curve, how the supply curve shifts and whether the model 
includes non-zero market margin.  
  Models 1 is included so that the quantitative difference between estimates from 
conventional and alternative EDM can be more easily understood. For example, the total gains 
from alternative EDM are expected to be much smaller than those from conventional EDM not 
only because of market margins but largely because alternative EDM uses pivotal shift while 
conventional EDM uses parallel shifts in the supply curve, and switching from parallel shift to 
pivotal shift often reduces the estimated total welfare gains (Alston et al., 1998). Therefore if the 
focus is on the inclusion of market margins, then the comparison of model 1 and alternative 
EDM may be more informative than the comparison of conventional and alternative EDM.  
  This study, however, does not examine in detail the difference between alternative EDM 
and model 1. This is because model 1 is rarely used in the literature, nor is it preferred over 
alternative EDM because of their restrictive assumptions about zero-market margins or home 
consumption curves. In addition, findings from comparing alternative EDM and model 1 is only 
empirical and cannot be easily generalized because the differences depend on many other 
structural parameters used in the model, even though comparison of alternative EDM and model 
1 may provide some picture of how relaxing assumptions on market margin and home 
consumption curves alter the estimation results.  
  Model 1 is similar to conventional EDM and begin with conditions (1) through (3) with p 
= 
f
P ˆ (weighted average of farmgate sales price) obtained in (24). The only difference between 
                                                           
13 For example, it is possible to predict s
i  ˆ and  h






estimated this way and 
f
i p ˆ and i ˆ , however, many producers falls outside autarky. It is because the estimation of 
MC and MU using regression results from previous chapter is unreliable due to the data limitation.    15 
 
models 1 and conventional EDM is the fact that now both qs,i and qd are in constant elasticity 
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3.1.3  Expected  findings  on  pro-poorness  of  GM  cassava  from  a  comparison  of 
conventional and alternative EDM  
  The differences between conventional EDM and alternative EDM may lead to different 
implications on the pro-poorness of GM cassava, and how they differ can be partly inferred from 
the characteristics of cassava producers. Some insights are gained from analyzing formulas (4) 
through (7) for ∆PW combined with how relevant characteristics of cassava producers vary 
across different income levels.  
  Figure 11 through Figure 14 show the most salient characteristics of cassava producers 
across different income levels. Figure 11 shows the proportion of the population who belong to a 
cassava-producing household with a particular income range. Figure 12 through  Figure 14 plot 
the median of farmgate prices (estimated for some groups of producers using regressions (25) 
and (27)), per capita annual cassava production and per capita daily cassava consumption against 
per capita income levels. Ignoring all the intra-household income allocation, Figure 11 indicates 
that almost half of cassava-producing households earned less than US$100 per capita; 75% 
earned less than US$200 in 1997
14. Figure 12 through Figure 14 suggest the following: lower-
income cassava producers tend to produce and consume less and face higher farmgate prices.  
  Section 2.1.3 indicates that the ∆PW in conventional EDM tends to be more positive for 
cassava producers with larger production and home consumption quantity. In addition, since 
conventional EDM assumes only one price and ∆PW in conventional EDM uses the relative 
change in equilibrium price dp/p for all types of producers, it may overstate dp/p for cassava 
producers with a relatively higher farmgate price when dp is the same for all producers and thus 
may underestimate the welfare gains for producers with higher farmgate prices
15. 
  The fact that lower-income cassava producers tend to produce and consume less and face 
higher farmgate prices does not necessarily indicate how alternative and conventional EDM may 
differ since the alternative EDM includes additional structural parameters not present in 
conventional EDM. The characteristics of lower-income cassava producers, however, do indicate 
that although welfare gains obtained through alternative EDM is likely to be lower than through 
conventional EDM, it may not be so for lower-income cassava producers.   
 
                                                           
14 Per capita GDP for Benin in 1997 was around US $300 (World Bank).  
15 As mentioned in section 2.1.2.2, alternative EDM follows Alston et al. (1998) and treats market margins between 
consumption markets and farmgate price as exogenous and constant ((9)). (9) therefore assumes that the change in 
farmgate sales price is the same for the entire cassava producer group i. In the alternative EDM, the similar value for 
dp/p is smaller for producers with a higher farmgate price (dp is negative since the productivity growth lowers the 
price). On the contrary, the alternative EDM also follows the suggestions by Lindner and Jarrett (1978) and assumes 
that GM cassava lowers the marginal cost for all cassava producers by the same proportion, which means that 
cassava producers with a higher farmgate price experience a larger reduction in marginal cost so that Ki is the same 
for all producers. Then dp/p + Ki when alternative EDM is more positive for producers with a higher farmgate price, 
and assuming the same dp/p as in conventional EDM will underestimate dp/p + Ki.  
     From conventional EDM formulas (4), we can see that the larger dp/p + Ki leads to more positive ∆PW (see 
Appendix A. 2).  16 
 
3.2  Description of cassava market structure in Benin inferred from the Benin data set 
and other sources of information 
  Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the Benin cassava market structure inferred from the 
Benin data set, and annual population growth rate in 1997
16. To be consistent with the findings in 
Takeshima (2008), cassava farmers are grouped into 2 categories, namely on-farm seller type 
who are likely to sell cassava at farmgate and off-farm seller type who are likely to sell cassava 
at the distant markets. Autarkic farmers are categorized into one of aforementioned seller types 
by using the regression results for probit in Takeshima (2008), so that an autarkic producer i is 
assumed an on-farm seller if  
pr Prob(  = on farm seller| ) 0.5 i ix  , or  pr
pr ˆ 0.5 i x     (32) 
and i is an off-farm seller otherwise.  
 
3.3  Estimation of welfare effects 
3.3.1  Simulation method 
  Many recent studies using EDM deal with the uncertainty in market structures such as the 
supply and demand elasticities by adding idiosyncratic errors to some of the structural 
parameters and analyzing the sensitivity of estimates with respect to the change in structural 
parameters (Davis and Espinoza, 1998; Zhao et al., 2000). Although the choice of error terms 
can be arbitrary, a common approach is to use the standard deviation associated with parameters 
estimated in previous studies. This study, using the regression results from Takeshima (2008) 
and regressions (25), (26), assigns the distributions for some parameters in Table 8. 1000 
simulations are run, each of which uses different combinations of parameters drawn from the 
distributions specified in Table 8. The simulation results are then presented as the range rather 
than the point estimates.  
 
3.3.2  Potential rates of adoption and expected yield growth of virus-resistant cassava in 
simulation 
  This study does not explicitly model the adoption rates over time as has been done in the 
literature. This study instead assumes that all cassava producers will adopt a new GM variety 
after a certain period of time due to the following reasons. First, the purpose of this study is to 
compare the estimates from conventional and alternative EDM, and including an adoption trend 
may add more uncertainty to each model and thus make it more difficult to interpret the 
difference between conventional and alternative EDM. Second, GM cassava is expected to be 
distributed to producers at a significantly low price. Adoption rates for GM cassava can therefore 
eventually reach 100%. 
  Expected percentage growth of yield (y) depends on many factors. The development of 
GM cassava for Benin seems to be lagging behind some other African countries whose data are 
not available; furthermore, how the cassava yield will be affected depends on the particular 
varieties introduced in the future.  
  Studies of cassava in other African countries provide some insights into the expected 
yield growth of several varieties of cassava (30% for virus-resistant cassava in Uganda
17, loss 
due to virus is up to 60% in Ghana (Horna et al., 2007)). Assuming that the average loss in 
                                                           
16 More detailed description of the dataset is available in Takeshima (2008). 
17 Based on conversations at the Donald Danforth Center in Saint Louis, which spearheads the research in the 
development of GM cassava.   17 
 
cassava yield in Ghana is 30% (mid-point of 0% and 60%), a similar yield growth for a virus-
resistant variety of cassava in Benin should be around 30%.  
  Complications arise when information about a new GM variety is given in terms of cost 
reduction instead of yield growth, since a 30% cost reduction is not necessarily 30% yield 
growth unless the supply elasticity is one. The alternative EDM therefore uses two scenarios: 1) 
30% yield growth for all producers; 2) 30 % reduction in MC relative to the initial farmgate sales 
price. For 1), the supply curve is shifted out by 30% horizontally, while for 2) the supply curve is 
shifted down by 30% vertically. Since the elasticity of supply is less than one, the supply curve 
shifts down by more than 30% in case 1) and shifts out less than 30% in case 2).
18 
  This study therefore considers two scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes yi = 0.3 (30% increase 
in yield); scenario 2 assumes ki = 0.3, as shown in Table 8, in which ki is the percentage 
reduction in marginal cost at the initial equilibrium production quantity. The underlying 
assumptions for both scenarios are the following: in scenario 1, producers with a less elastic 
supply curve experience a larger proportional reduction in MC. In scenario 2, producers with a 
less elastic supply curve experience a smaller yield growth.   
  Benin’s population growth rate is around 2.5%, so this study shifts out the demand curve 
horizontally by 2.5% from the initial demand curve as is suggested by Norton et al. (1987). 
Using a 100% adoption rate and shifting the demand curve by 2.5% mean that the estimated 
welfare gains assume that all cassava producers will adopt GM cassava after one year. This may 
be unrealistic, so it might be wise to use the population level in 10 years since it is possible to 
reach 100% adoption by then. However, assuming explicitly when the 100% is reached does not 
make the model more realistic for several reasons. First, it is unclear how population growth can 
lead to the shift in demand curve. Second, many studies apply rather arbitrary discount factors 
for welfare gains in the future. From these perspectives, assuming a 100% adoption rate in one 
year may not be so problematic, particularly where the comparison of alternative and 
conventional EDM is concerned.  
 
  The simulation is programmed using statistical software R version 2.7.0, an open-source 
software developed by R Development Core Team.  
 
4.  Results and interpretations 
4.1  Total welfare gains 
  The results of interest are summarized in Table 9 through Table 11 and Figure 16. Table 
9 and Table 10 show the percentile of estimated welfare effects from alternative and 
conventional EDM for scenarios 1 and 2. For example, Table 9 says that the total welfare effects 
(∆Total) estimated by alternative EDM are above US$13.9 million 50% of the time; 95% of the 
time it is between US$9.5 million and US$27.3 million. Table 9 and Table 10 indicate the 
following: 1) Consumers’ welfare effects estimated using conventional EDM ( C S C ˆ  ) is more 
positive than those estimated using alternative EDM ( A S C ˆ  ); 2) Total welfare effects estimated 
using conventional EDM (∆TotalC) is generally more positive than those estimated using 
alternative EDM (∆TotalA); 3) whether producers’ welfare effects estimated using conventional 
EDM ( C W P ˆ  ) is more positive or negative than those estimated using alternative EDM ( A W P ˆ  ) 
                                                           
18 At the median, the supply curve shifts down by 50% in scenario 1) and shifts out by around 15% in scenario 2).  18 
 
is less obvious, and the intervals for both  C W P ˆ  and  A W P ˆ   are large relative to the median of 
C W P ˆ   and  A W P ˆ   (high coefficient of variations).  
  At the median (50%) of the estimates, the bias for ∆TotalC is roughly  
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C   (33) 
  Since Benin’s GDP in 1998 was approximately US$ 2 billion (World Bank), the 
difference in ∆TotalC and ∆TotalA is roughly 1.6% or 0.7% of GDP for scenario 1 and 0.8% or 
0.4% of GDP for scenario 2, which can be substantial. The results indicate that, at the median 
level, the difference between conventional and alternative EDM can be significantly large and 
lead to serious policy implications. 
  The results in Table 9 and Table 10 indicate how the estimated welfare effects can drop 
from conventional EDM to model 1. The reason for the much lower estimate from model 1 
compared to conventional EDM is mainly that model 1 assumes pivotal shift while conventional 
EDM assumes parallel shift in the linear supply curve. Although the estimates from models 1 and 
2 are not directly comparable with alternative EDM, they indicate that the important result for 
alternative EDM is relatively high ∆PW compared to ∆Total and ∆CS
19. One reason for the 
relatively high ∆PW is that given the same level of yield growth or proportional reduction in 
marginal cost at the initial equilibrium, the drop in price is relatively smaller in the alternative 
EDM.  
 
4.2  Implication of results using the information of intervals  
  The inference made at the median is, however, based on only one of the many possible 
estimates. In connection to the empirical estimation methods, the inference based on the intervals 
is more informative, particularly for  C W P ˆ  and  A W P ˆ  , whose coefficient of variation seems 
high. The focus thus shifts to how the estimates from conventional EDM differ from those from 
alternative EDM “given each combination of structural parameters.” We first define a variable,  
  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ A C EDM   e alternativ EDM   al convention A C C A C C A C D w w w w w             , 
in which C ˆ = ( si  ˆ , d  ˆ , A ˆ , y ˆ ) and  A  ˆ  = ( i ˆ , ) ˆ ( ˆ f
i
CM
i p  , hi  ˆ , δ) in Table 8,  ) ˆ ( ˆC C w   and 
) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆA A C w    are general notation for the welfare effects (total, producer, consumers) estimated 
using conventional EDM (which is a function of  C ˆ alone) and alternative EDM (function of 
C ˆ and  A  ˆ ). 
  Table 11 shows the probability that 0 ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆD  A C w   or probability that 
) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ A C A C C w w       from the simulation. ∆TotalC > ∆TotalA over 99% of the time in both 
scenarios 1 and 2. The fact that ∆TotalC is larger than ∆TotalA with such a high probability 
                                                           
19Models 1 is not comparable with alternative EDM for several reasons including the issues discussed in footnote 32. 
Alternative EDM assumes individual demand curves at each consumption market calibrated from respective market 
price  CM
i P   in which not all demand curves have constant elasticity form, as explained in footnote 32, while 
models 1 implicitly assumes the same price for all consumption markets as well as farmgate sales price. 19 
 
provides one ground for why policy implications based only on conventional EDM may not be 
reliable and a model such as alternative EDM should also be considered.  
 
4.3  Detailed analysis of ∆PWC and ∆PWA 
  As in Table 11, whether ∆PWC is more positive than ∆PWA is unclear. The importance of 
comparison between ∆PWC and ∆PWA rather relates to their estimated intervals which reflect 
their accuracy given the precisions of estimated structural parameters. Figure 16 shows how each 
combination of structural parameters  C ˆ
 and  A  ˆ
 results in different  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ
A C A W P     and 
) ˆ ( ˆ
C C W P   . Figure 16 indicates two important points. First, as is indicated by the correlation 
coefficient,  A ˆW P  and  C ˆW P   have a relatively weak relationship, indicating that  C ˆW P   has 
relatively low power to approximate  A ˆW P  . The low correlation coefficient thus implies that the 
power of conventional EDM to approximate the welfare gain estimates can be easily 
overwhelmed by the lack of some additional information such as the alternative assumptions on 
how the supply curve shifts or whether market margins are zero.  
  Secondly, actual deviations of  C ˆW P   from  A ˆW P  , which are illustrated by the quantile 
smoothing spline (Koenker et al., 1994) in Figure 16, indicate the degree of the gap between 
C ˆW P   and  A ˆW P  and the probability of exceeding certain levels of gap. For example, when the 
A ˆW P   is US$ 5 million,  C ˆW P  can be estimated to be above US$ 10 million almost 50% of the 
time. US$ 5 million for Benin cassava-producing households in 1998 would be roughly 1% of 
their income. The US$ 5 million deviation of  C ˆW P   from  A ˆW P   may have important meaning 
in Benin, whose economy has grown approximately 5% a year in recent years. The findings in 
Figure 16 thus imply that C ˆW P   can create bias in estimates that can be big enough to influence 
Benin’s agricultural policy.  
 
4.4  Implications on welfare gain distributions across producers of different income levels 
  Another important question is how lower-income cassava producers benefit relative to 
higher-income cassava producers. Figure 17 illustrates the intervals of ∆PW (per capita, year) in 
different per capita annual income levels estimated from alternative EDM in scenario 2
20. Figure 
18 plots the 50
th percentile of ∆PW for producers estimated from the two EDMs to see how each 
estimate provides different implications regarding how welfare gains are shared across different 
income levels.  
  Figure 17 and Figure 18 essentially indicate the following. Lower-income cassava 
producers (below US$200) tend to benefit slightly more than do middle-income (above US$200) 
cassava producers (Figure 17). In addition, although the alternative EDM generally estimates 
slightly and insignificantly lower ∆PW for all producers than does conventional EDM, 
alternative EDM provides estimates of slightly higher ∆PW for low-income producers than does 
conventional EDM. Slightly higher estimates of ∆PW from conventional EDM may thus come 
mainly from the higher-income cassava producers (Figure 18).  
                                                           
20 The figure for scenario 1 is similar except for the overall level of welfare gains in that lower-income cassava 
producers seem to gain more than do middle-income cassava producers.  20 
 
  Although the result in Figure 18 cannot be fully explained by the aforementioned reasons, 
Figure 18 still indicates that conventional and alternative EDM may lead to different 
implications regarding whether or not GM cassava in Benin is pro-poor.    
  Future research will probably still rely on conventional EDM due to its parsimony. 
Conventional EDM can even be used to gain insights into how welfare is distributed across 
producer groups with different income levels and thus how technology aids the poor. The 
empirical results of this study, however, indicate that when the research question explores how 
the gains are distributed across producers with different income levels, or whether the technology 
is pro-poor, then conventional EDM may provide a distorted figure especially when the data 
suggests a great degree of heterogeneity among producers with different income levels.   
 
5.  Summary and conclusion 
  Productivity growth for orphan crops like cassava can significantly affect the welfare of 
cassava producers, who make up one of the most impoverished groups in the world. The actual 
welfare gain for cassava producers is, however, questionable because it depends on how much 
productivity growth can offset the fall in cassava price also brought by the productivity growth. 
Therefore, from the perspective of poverty reduction, one of the important research questions is 
how great a gain in welfare productivity growth in cassava can bring to cassava producers, 
particularly lower-income cassava producers.  
  Many past studies have conducted ex ante welfare effects estimations for similar 
subsistence crops using conventional EDM, which employs assumptions that may be unrealistic. 
These questionable assumptions, however, may not necessarily invalidate the estimates from 
conventional EDM as long as they provide good approximations of actual welfare gains brought 
by productivity growth. Whether it is important to question the assumptions in conventional 
EDM, therefore, should be determined by examining the estimates obtained from conventional 
EDM; the examination must also take into account how conventional EDM itself is calibrated by 
empirically estimated parameters.  
  This study contributes to the literature by providing one empirical example of 
aforementioned issues. The findings suggest that conventional EDM, which employs 
controversial assumptions for subsistence crops like cassava, may often provide significantly 
biased welfare gain estimates given the degree of reliability of the parameters used in the context 
of productivity growth for subsistence crops. It may also provide incorrect implications about 
whether such productivity growth is pro-poor. 
  Although the properties of both conventional and alternative EDM remain to be more 
fully analyzed, these methods are two different ways to estimate the welfare effects of many 
semi-subsistence crops with data similar to the Benin data. The literature often relies more on 
conventional EDM rather than the alternative EDM. This study provides an empirical example 
that shows that it may be important to use alternative EDM as well as conventional EDM for 
more informed policy making about investment in public research on semi-subsistence crops as a 
tool to reduce poverty.  21 
 
 
Figure 1. Alternative assumption 1: heterogenenous farmgate price 
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Figure 2. Alternative assumption 2: constant elasticity form and pivotal shi
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Figure 4. Illustrations of alternative EDM as a combination of each assumption in Figure 1 through Figure 3
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Figure 5. Assumed relationships between a cassava producing household and the market 
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 Figure 7. Supply and demand curves for subsistence cassava-producing household 
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Figure 9. Assumption of no-autarkic consumption market(s) 
 
  
Figure 10. Relevant price for semi-subsistence cassava producers group i facing two 
transportation costs 
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Figure 12. Median of estimated farmgate 
price (US cent / kg, fresh tuber) by 
income 
                                                           
21 Proportion is calculated using number of 
observations (household) * household size * 
survey weights for each observation 






































Figure 13. Production (ton / per capita, 
year) by income levels 
 














































Figure 14. Home consumption (kg / per 
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Figure 16. Comparison of  ) ( ˆ
A   W P and ) ( ˆ
C   W P for each Θ =  ˆ (lines in the figure are the 
quantile smoothing spline developed by Koenker et al. (1994)) 
 
(Correlation coefficient = 0.05)  (Correlation coefficient = 0.27) 


















































Figure 17. Intervals of welfare gains for producers in different income levels (scenario 2) 






























































Figure 18. Median of welfare effects for producers in different income levels (conventional and 
alternative EDM) 
Scenario 2 
The 50% line (solid bold 
line) in Figure 17 is 
equivalent to the solid 
line in scenario 2 of 
Figure 18. Two lines 
appear different since 
different functions are 
used in the software. The 
purpose of Figure 17 is to 
illustrate the interval of 
welfare gains from 
alternative EDM for 
different income levels, 
while Figure 18 
compares the median of 
intervals for different 
models. 32 
 
Table 2. Models used in welfare effects estimation 
  Market margin  Linear or constant 
elasticity  Shifts in supply curve 
Conventional EDM  No  Linear  Parallel 
Model 1  No  Constant elasticity  Pivotal 
Alternative EDM  Yes  Constant elasticity  Pivotal 
 
Table 3. Structure of the model 
Conditions  Equation 
Individual supply and home consumption schedule  (16), (17') 
Market clearing condition  (18) 
Measurement of welfare effects for population group i  (19), (20) 
 
Table 4. Important variables estimated (calibrated) from the dataset 
  Definition  Variables used 




  Farmgate sales price    Regression (25), (27) 
i ˆ
 
Market margin (for individual 
producers)    Regression (26), (28) 
CM
i p ˆ  
Price at local consumption 
market 
f
i p ˆ ,  i ˆ   (29) 

P ˆ   Average consumption price  i i i w H S ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ,  CM
i p ˆ  (22) 
CM
i  ˆ  
Market margin (between local 
consumption markets) 

P ˆ , CM
i p ˆ   (12) 
si  ˆ
  Elasticity of production    Regression (Takeshima, 2008) 
hi  ˆ
  Elasticity of home consumption   Regression (Takeshima, 2008) 
d  ˆ   Elasticity of demand    Regression (Takeshima, 2008) 
  i
CM
i i p S  ˆ ,   Production curve  (16)  0 
  i
CM
i i p H  ˆ ,   Home consumption curve  (16)  0 
 
Table 5. Structure of Benin cassava market 
    On-farm type  Off-farm type  Non-producers 
Production (t)    424519  423028   
Consumption (t)    77524  100555  669468 
% of subsistence consumption    18  24   
Population growth rate (%)    2.5  2.5  2.5 
Estimated population (million)    2.75   33 
 
Table 6. Regressions (25) and (26) 
  Regression (25)  Regression (26) 
Dependent variables   
f
i p ˆ ln     i ˆ ln  
  pf  ˆ     pf S  ˆ  
  ˆ       ˆ S  
Region 2  .076  (.383)     
Region 3  -.328  (.497)     
Region 4  .619  (.379)     
Region 5  .503  (.394)     
Region 6  .437  (.362)     
Fresh-tuber (yes = 1)  -.646  (.193)     
Flour (yes = 1)  1.116***  (.208)     
Dried tuber (yes = 1)  .026  (.309)     
January  .139  (.157)     
February  -.366***  (.116)     
March  .189  (.119)     
April  -.171  (.121)     
May  -.079  (.127)     
June  .157  (.173)     
July  -.175  (.200)     
August  -.063  (.174)     
September  -.048  (.291)     
October  -.068  (.239)     
November  -.503  (.326)     
Distance to paved road (10km)  -.003  (.009)     
Distance to passable road (10km)  -.006  (.007)     
Distance to phone (10km)      1.483  (3.219) 
Off farm type seller (yes =1)  .203*  (.109)     
(10km) point    sales    to Distance       .309***  (.088) 
Membership to cooperative (yes 
= 1)      -.460  (.307) 
Household head education (year)      -.061  (.050) 
Constant  3.397***  (.409)  .702**  (.336) 
R
2  .708  .387 
Number of observation  192  53 
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Table 7. Summary statistics of estimated prices, per-unit transactions costs (US cents / kg, fresh-
tuber) 
  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Farmgate sales price (
f
i p ˆ )  5.22  3.47  0.28  40.09 
Consumption market price ( CM
i p ˆ )  12.92  5.49  0.55  119.94 
Per-unit transactions costs ( i ˆ )  7.70  1.01  0.16  118.58 
Weighted farmgate sales price (
f
P ˆ )  2.50  2.47  1.93  3.54 
Weighted consumption market price (P ˆ )  3.35  3.32  2.67  4.48 
 
Table 8. Important variables estimated (calibrated) from the dataset  
N  : Normal distribution, N
+: Positively truncated normal distribution 
U  : Uniform distribution 
  On farm Sellers Types  Off farm Sellers Types  Sources  
 
f
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   Regression (26) 
δ  (in equation (31))  U [0, 2]   
si  ˆ
  N





−(−.89, .19)  N
− (−.39, .25) 
d  ˆ
  U[-.91, -.46]    Deaton (1988), Tsegai and Kormawa (2002) 
A ˆ (% adoption rate) 
100   
Shifts in supply curve 
Shifts out horizontally by 30% (scenario 1) 
Shifts down vertically by 30% (scenario 2)   35 
 
Table 9. Scenario 1 (million US$) 
Percentile  2.5%  50%  97.5%  % change in price 
    ∆Total     
Conventional EDM  17.3  31.5  58.1  -50.6 
Model 1  7.4  9.5  12.3  -23.6 
Alternative EDM  9.5  13.9  27.3  -12.3 
    ∆CS     
Conventional EDM  8.7  22.3  49.5   
Model 1  7.0  9.8  14.0   
Alternative EDM  3.1  6.2  11.3   
    ∆PW     
Conventional EDM  4.8  10.0  15.2   
Model 1  -3.9  -0.2  1.4   
Alternative EDM  1.8  7.5  20.5   
*US $1 = 588 FCFA on July 1997.  
 
Table 10. Scenario 2 (million US$) 
Percentile  2.5%  50%  97.5%  % change in price 
    ∆Total     
Conventional EDM  13.3  16.3  20.0  -27.5 
Model 1  2.4  4.6  8.2  -12.4 
Alternative EDM  3.3  7.8  16.9  -6.4 
    ∆CS     
Conventional EDM  8.0  10.9  16.9   
Model 1  2.3  4.7  8.3   
Alternative EDM  0.7  2.9  5.9   
    ∆PW     
Conventional EDM  0.5  5.0  8.4   
Model 1  -1.4  -0.2  0.7   
Alternative EDM  0.5  4.5  12.3   
 
Table 11. Difference between ) ( ˆ  A w and ) ( ˆ  C w ( ) ˆ | ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ (       C A w w ) 
 
Scenario 1 
y ˆ = 0.3 
Scenario 2 
i k = 0.3 
 Prob (∆TotalC > ∆TotalA)  100 %  99 % 
) ˆ ˆ Prob( A C W P W P       72 %  55 % 
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Appendix  
A. 1   Important properties of conventional EDM 
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when εd < 0 and εsi > 0, since ssi ≥ 0,     
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dp
K from (6'). Therefore we have  0   K
p
dp
, which is 1). Next, for producer group i, 































      (4') 
In (4'), since dp < 0, pi, qs,i, εsi, hi > 0, we then have  






























q p PW    (4") 
Equation (4") also shows that a larger qs,i and qs,i hi lead to a larger ∆PWi since dp < 0, which 
together proves 2).  
 
A. 2   Proof of footnote 15 
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  (39) 
We know from discussion in A. 1 that dp/p + K > 0 for εd < 0 and εsi > 0, and therefore for any 
dp/p > K, (39) > 0. This proves that a larger dp/p + Ki leads to more positive ∆PW, and thus the 
explanation in footnote 15 holds.  